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A  W h i t e  P a p e r
...on the role of government in Australia. Last 
December the Reserve Bank governor Bernie Fraser 
called for a new statement of government philosophy 
along the lines of the 1945 White Paper Full 
Employment In Australia.. This would set the terms 
of the debate in the era after the economic liberal 
ascendancy. In the interests of agenda-setting, we 
decided to take up Bernie Fraser's offer. So here's 
ALR's White Paper for government in the 90s.
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A
t the height of the 80s boom and its attendant 
excesses, it became fashionable to talk as if 
government was in itself a bad thing, and 
that the less of it we had the better. The dead hand 
of government was stifling productivity, keeping 
the labour market unnecessarily rigid, and locking 
up potentially profitable industries in the hands of 
inefficient government monopolies. What could 
government do well? Well, it could be good at 
withdrawing from things it had done in the past.
However, over the last several years the tide 
towards minimal government intervention in the 
affairs of business has clearly come to a halt, and it 
may now even be going into reverse. First John 
Major in Britain, and now more decisively Bill 
Clinton in the US, have tried to articulate a new 
role for the government in the economy, from 
Major’s tentative embrace of Germany’s ‘social 
market’ concept to Clinton’s more robust apprecia­
tion of the role of government in ‘the work of 
nations’. And now, in one of the most spectacular 
turnarounds in Australian political history, even 
John Hewson has come to discover the necessity of 
some level of ‘government intervention’ in Fight- 
back Mark II. The stage seems set for the Labor 
government to discover, or rediscover, a ‘proper 
role for government’, as Bemie Fraser puts it, as the 
centrepiece of its new agenda as it campaigns for its 
fifth term. In this at least the tide is running its way. 
But how is such a model to be defined, and what are 
its historical roots?
Clearly, the time has come for a new, or re­
newed, model of government, one which can pro­
vide the general philosophical foundation for a 
more realistic approach to policymaking in the 
coming decade. This does not mean a return to 
some of the fantasies of the Left about a command­
ing role for the state in economy and society, 
whether along the lines of the old Soviet-style 
planning or of the much more nebulous radicalism 
of the ‘new’ Left of the 70s and after. Rather, it 
means a new understanding of the idea of govern­
ment itself as an activity, one which cannot reason­
ably hope to shape society along the lines of Left 
fantasies, but which on the other hand is necessary 
to the functioning of society, contrary to the myths 
of the minimal government vogue.
Why did the minimal government model come 
unstuck? One reason is that the model was ham­
pered by a lack of historical memory. For the simple 
if neglected fact is that there has never been a time 
when serious analysts of capitalism believed that it 
could govern itself without outside intervention. 
Not even Adam Smith himself, supposedly the 
figurehead of the minimal government vogue, be­
lieved that. Instead the history of the last three 
centuries of thinking about capitalism suggests that 
the crucial question has always been how to govern 
capitalism, and how to govern it well.
The debate really goes back to the 15th century 
political theorist Niccolo Machiavelli, the author 
of the classic The Prince. According to the French 
historian Michel Foucault, Machiavelli aimed to 
define an ‘art of government’—a way of under­
standing the activity of government which could 
generate a model for the practice of government— 
appropriate to the modem, post-Medieval era. The 
particular system he arrived at was and has re­
mained notorious for its ruthless advocacy of the 
rights of the prince to establish and maintain his 
sovereignty. More important than his system, how­
ever, were the debates he set off among political 
thinkers over the succeeding two centuries con­
cerning the appropriate relationship between citi­
zens and the sovereign in a modem secular state, 
and more particularly the most appropriate means 
of governing such a state.
One of these debates, concerning what its con­
temporaries called ‘civic republicanism’, harked 
back to the political language of active citizenship 
of ancient Greece and Rome. But the problem it 
pointed to was new, and was specifically concerned 
with the new developing market forces of an emer­
gent capitalism. How, the civic republicans asked, 
could the emergence of what they called ‘commer­
cial society’ be reconciled with the ideal of an active 
and public-spirited citizenship drawn from the an­
cient world?
The classic model of civic republicanism relied 
for its success upon a social and economic organisa­
tion of affairs—the diffusion of small-scale prop­
erty-holding among what Thomas Jefferson was to 
call ‘yeoman farmers’—which allowed citizens to 
behave in an active, public-spirited manner. Medi­
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eval Europe had clearly not been the kind of society 
to encourage the civic republican ideal. But nei­
ther, it appeared, did the emerging forces of capital­
ism tend to encourage it. The civic republican ideal 
lauded ‘virtue’ over ‘corruption’ and the public over 
the private interest. Clearly the emerging forces of 
‘commercial society’ tended to promote private 
interest over public interest. They also appeared to 
undermine the ethic of simplicity and austerity on 
which the civic republican model relied, replacing 
it with a lust for ‘opulence’ and ‘luxury’. How, the 
civic humanists wondered, could the forces of pri­
vate interest and individual self-aggrandisement 
unleashed by ‘commercial society’ be reconciled 
with a harmonious and equitable political order 
based upon a community of free citizens?
This was the dilemma to which Adam Smith 
and the economic liberals of the 18th century 
responded with his their well- known vision of the 
‘hidden hand’—a force which provided a coinci­
dence between private interest and public virtue. 
Smith was confronting two distinct problems. On 
the one hand he had to respond to the charge of the 
civic humanists that the forces of individual self-
• interest in ‘commercial society’ tended to under­
mine civic virtue and encourage corruption. Smith 
responded to this charge by arguing that, properly 
governed, a commercial society could be virtu­
ous—because, among other things, commerce en­
couraged sobriety and thrift.
On the other hand Smith was concerned to 
defend what he and his contemporaries called ‘civil 
society’ against the encroachments of the state. In 
Continental Europe since the 16th century the 
‘absolutist’ monarchs had claimed the right of the 
sovereign to determine all aspects of policy in the 
interest of strengthening the power of the state. In 
this doctrine of raison d'etat or ‘reason of state’ the 
economy and society were transparent to the sover­
eign, who could manipulate them at will by judi­
cious use of policy. Smith denied that the economy 
or society were transparent to policy, or that poli­
cies aimed at strengthening the economic power of 
the state were likely to achieve their aims. Rather, 
he argued, the economic realm was governed by 
laws peculiar to it, which the sovereign could never 
entirely understand: the ‘hidden hand’ was neces­
sarily hidden.
But this was not to say that Smith’s was a 
doctrine of minimal government. Indeed, it was 
Smith who described economics as ‘a branch of the 
science of a statesman or legislator’. Rather than 
arguing for the absence of government, Smith was 
arguing for a different kind of government. Instead 
of trying to substitute for the ‘natural’ processes of 
the economy, Smith argued, government should try 
to assist the economy to function better—in 
Foucault’s words, it needed to ‘make regulations 
which permit natural regulations to operate’. Like 
the civic humanists, Smith was in fact highly mis­
trustful of ‘private interest’. There was a ‘public 
interest’, and it was the proper end of government, 
but it was by no means identical to the interests of 
the state.
Hence Smith, like later classical economists 
such as John Stuart Mill, saw a social as well as 
economic rationale for government. While a parti­
san of the effects of ‘commercial society’ in stimu­
lating liberty, he was severely critical of its social 
effects, arguing that it tended to render the working 
classes “as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a 
human being to become...In every improved and 
civilised society this is the stage into which the 
labouring poor...must necessarily fall, unless gov­
ernment takes some pains to prevent it”. Mill and 
others took Smith’s social and governmental con­
cerns much further. While supportive of the general 
principle of laissez-faire, Mill distinguished between 
‘authoritative’ and non-authoritative government. 
The former, along the lines of the absolutist monar­
chies, simply prohibited and forbade the latter 
envisaged itself as a partner of private interests, 
establishing national banks alongside private banks, 
and public schools alongside church schools. 
Scorned by Karl Marx as advocating a ‘shallow 
syncretism’ between capitalism and socialism, Mill 
nevertheless advocated a far-reaching liberal pro­
gram of social reform which anticipated the 20th 
century mixed economy and welfare state.
Moreover, this extended liberalism of Mill and 
others was paralleled by shifts in the manner of 
government on the European Continent. The threat 
of democracy after 1848, along with the breakup of 
the old precapitalist social ties, necessitated a ‘so­
cial liberalism’ concerned with reconciling the new 
individualist social order and the new more limited 
state with the expanded requirements of social 
citizenship. The basis for this, as the French histo­
rian of thought Jacques Donzelot notes, was the 
principle of social solidarity: “a principle of govern­
ing by neither too much nor too little social bond­
ing”. This became the bedrock for the 20th century 
welfare state, the distinctive blend of social inter­
ventionism and economic rectitude which has domi­
nated 20th century policymaking. And this in turn 
led to the modem liberal mode of governance of 
Keynes.
For Keynes in his day was concerned with many 
of the same problems of government that con­
fronted Smith. Robert Skidelsky, in his recent biog­
raphy of Keynes, cites one of Keynes’ former stu­
dents: “He [Keynes] tried to devise the minimum 
government controls which would allow free enter­
prise to work.” Skidelsky adds: “Keynes did not 
deny that much of economic life was non-chaotic 
and self-regulating”; the claim that he “substituted 
an economics of power and will for the self-regula­
tory mechanisms of civil society” is “vastly exagger­
ated”. Like Smith, Keynes’ view of government was 
liberal in the best classical sense; the role of govem-
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ment was “to make regulations which permit natu­
ral regulations to operate”.
Indeed, the belief that the debate over ‘state 
intervention’ is an all-or-nothing, laissezfaireor the 
nanny state choice is a contemporary fantasy. And, 
paradoxically, the belief that the capitalist economy 
in a modem society can run itself with minimal 
intervention is also chiefly a doctrine of the latter 
20thcentury—paradoxically, because the economy 
now is a far more complex set of processes than it 
was in the 18th century, and bears far less resem­
blance to the free markets of the economic text­
books. But as the end of the century approaches the 
good sense of the old debates on the importance of 
a role for government in a ‘commercial society’ 
seems undiminished.
Governments like that of Britain’s Margaret 
Thatcher, which aimed to return to a minimal 
government model which they wrongly associated 
with Adam Smith and the classical economists, 
have never really succeeded in their aims. In 1991, 
for instance, the share of the public sector in Brit­
ain’s GDP was almost exactly the same as it was in 
1979, when Mrs Thatcher came to power, while 
Britain’s privatised industries require more, not less, 
regulation than before. The fairest conclusion from 
the 80s would seem to be that the goal of minimal 
government is a futile and self-defeating one in 
complex modem capitalist economies. A more sen­
sible aim for the 1990s is a sty le of government more 
attuned to the problems of the ‘commercial society’ 
of our day.
What does this mean in practice ? First, it would
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A
ustralia is at a watershed. We have two intrac­
table economic problems which the policies 
of the 80s have failed to resolve —high unem­
ployment and a high current account deficit.
As well, the policies of the 80s have increased 
inequity through the growth of high incomes and of 
the wealth and power of a relatively small propor­
tion of the population. The quality and accessibility 
of community services have been reduced by cuts in 
government spending. And a serious aftermath of 
the excesses of private entrepreneurs during the 80s 
has been a loss of confidence in the probity, ethics 
and judgment of the Australian business commu­
nity both here and internationally.
Yet there were also demonstrable benefits from 
the policies of the 80s which now provide a firm 
basis for refocused economic strategy. First, Aus-
be an identifiably liberal style of government, fol­
lowing the manner of classical economic liberal­
ism—which is to say that it would be an ‘economi­
cal’ government making regulations ‘which allow 
natural regulations to operate’. It would also be a 
‘social’ govefnment in the sense meant by Mitchell 
Dean: “the active attempt to invent ways in which 
the limits and potentials of government, and the 
capacities and life-chances of individuals, are de­
fined according to a social rationality” (ALR 145). 
In this respect it would be similar to the social 
liberalism of Keynes and the welfare state.
But it would also be different, recognising that 
in the liberalised, internationalised societies and 
economies of the late 20th century the aspirations 
of social collectivism are probably unachievable, 
and perhaps even undesirable. Rather than promot­
ing the centralised public bureaucracies of the wel­
fare state, or the outmoded dirigisme of old-style 
state direction, it would advocate dispersed welfare 
provision and a closer partnership between govern­
ment and enterprise based at the level of the firm.
In short, it would recognise the historical failure 
both of the minimal government vogue and of the 
old-style ‘social government’ of the Keynesian era. 
And it would have the warrant of several hundred 
years of governmental experience for doing so. ■
DAVID BURCHELL is ALR’s editor. A shorter 
version of this article was published in the Aus­
tralian Financial Review’s bimonthly magazine, 
Review. Thanks are due to the Financial Review 
for permission to reproduce those portions.
tralia’s inflation rate of 0.7% is both the lowest in 
the OECD area—a fact which is not recognised by 
most economic analysts. Fig. 1 (provided by the 
Treasurer) shows general government gross debt
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